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"EXCESS BAGGAGE" AT THE F.A.A.:
ANALYZING THE TENSION BETWEEN

"OPEN SKIES" AND SAFETY POLICING IN
U.S. INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION POLICY
INTRODUCTION

Ever since the advent of a discrete international civil aviation industry, the United States has emerged as a preeminent
leader in the call for maximized freedom of routing across
national boundaries-an advocate of what is often labeled the
"Open Skies" doctrine. During a somewhat shorter time span,
the United States has, through the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),' likewise taken the lead in policing individual
nations' air safety standards. By applying the criteria of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),2 the U.S.
government has imposed many restrictions regarding routing
access on numerous nations.
The end of the Cold War, in this context, could have ostensibly meant two things. First, the general collapse of economic
isolation associated with statist economies might have signalled a total embrace of unrestricted aviation routing policy.
Second, in the absence of a Soviet bloc, the use of routing sanctions as a tool of U.S. foreign policy could have been drastically
reduced or obviated. Yet, neither of these circumstances has
come to pass. The conflicting U.S. and international civil aviation objectives of Open Skies and the sanctioning of foreign
nations' access based on assessments of their domestic safety
standards remain very much apparent. This Note seeks, first,

1. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), an agency within the Department of Transportation, was established in accordance with the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. §§ 40101-49105 (1994)).
2. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), as created by treaty,
was envisioned to be the world's effective authority on civil aviation. See Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295
[hereinafter Chicago Convention]. As one scholar points out, "ICAO became a
Specialised Agency of the United Nations soon after its creation." I.H.PH.
DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOoR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR LAw 7 (4th ed. 1991).
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to evaluate the implications of continuing U.S. adherence to
such a contradictory policy and, second, to propose alternatives
which would make the U.S. goal of access-oriented routing and
trustworthy safety precautions a more realistic prospect of
achievement.
Part I of this Note traces the origins of the U.S. Open
Skies emphasis with a particular focus on the Convention on
International Civil Aviation3 (Chicago Convention) and the socalled "Five Freedoms" of the air, which the United States has
continued to vigorously assert. Part II discusses the regime of
ICAO in regulating international air safety, the development of
U.S. policy in this area, and the use of sanctions against foreign nations' civil aviation access as a tool of foreign policy
during the Cold War. The second half of this Note moves the
clock forward to the present: Part III highlights the unbending
Open Skies advocacy that the United States continues to assert, whereas Part IV details the inherently contradictory reality of continued frequent sanctioning of international routes
from the United States abroad, based on the Department of
Transportation's judgments of inadequate or poor civil aviation
safeguards in target countries. This Note goes on to argue that
the dual goals of Open Skies and the assurance of air safety
under the Chicago Convention model are unattainable without
either: (a) placing ICAO-and not the FAA-in its contemplated role of policeman of the air, by giving it a purely "transnational" character by opening its membership not simply to
signatory states, but to other major players in the civil aviation industry; or (b) moving the United States toward revisiting the General Agreement on Trade Services4 (GATS) to
more broadly include civil aviation in its regime-to which it is
currently only partly applicable. This Note concludes that the
latter proposal is the more probable option, given that a radical restructuring of a U.N. organization is clearly contrary to
both the spirit and the text of the Chicago Convention, whereas the underlying basis for excluding civil aviation from GATS
constitutes a sincerely-held policy dispute between the United

3. See supra note 2.
4. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 28; 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
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States and the European Union (EU), thus subject to a more
conventional means of resolution.
I.

THE CHICAGO CONVENTION, BERMUDA I AND DoMEsTIc
DEREGULATION:
APPROACH

THE ROOTS OF THE U.S. OPEN SKIES

Although the question of regulating international civil
aviation appears to have found expression as early as 1919,'

the first multilateral accord in this area was the Chicago Convention, signed in Chicago on December 7, 1944.6 This convention "has as one of its fundamental principles the premise that

all states should be able to participate in air transport on the
basis of equality of opportunity."' At the Chicago Convention,

the U.S. delegation pushed for adoption of what it and its Canadian counterparts labeled as a recognition of five "freedoms

of the air."8 These Five Freedoms were defined as: (1) the
right to fly over foreign sovereign territory without landing; (2)

the right to land on foreign soil for technical reasons; (3) the
right to discharge passengers or cargo from the country of

origin abroad; (4) the reciprocal right to pick up traffic abroad,
headed for the bound party; and (5) the right to direct traffic to
or from the bound nation with an intermediate stop and loading in a third nation
The Chicago Convention's lasting contribution, however, to
the regulation of international civil aviation was the creation
of ICAO.'0 ICAO was charged with "[p]revent[ing] economic
waste caused by unreasonable competition"" and "promot[ing]
5. Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919,
11 L.N.T.S. 173. See also Bruce Stockfish, Opening Closed Skies: The Prospects for
Further Liberalization of Trade in InternationalAir Transport Services, 57 J. AIR
L. & COM. 599, 602 (1992).
6. Chicago Convention, supra note 2, Signature of Convention, 61 Stat. 1180,
1207, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 360.
7. Stockfish, supra note 5, at 603.
8. Id. at 603 n.12 (observing that the Canadian delegation at Chicago is
actually given credit for formulating the Five Freedoms concept).
9. See id. The Five Freedoms, however, were not actually adopted by the
delegates to the Chicago Convention. See id. at 604.
10. Chicago Convention, supra note 2, art. 43, 61 Stat. 1180, 1192, 15
U.N.T.S. 295, 324. ICAO, now an independent agency within the United Nations,
is headquartered in Montreal. For a discussion of ICAO, see Ruwantissa I.R.
Abeyratne, Would Competition in Commercial Aviation Ever Fit into the World
Trade Organization?,61 J. AIR L. & COM. 793, 808-09 and passim (1996).
11. Chicago Convention, supra note 2, art. 44(e) 61 Stat. 1180, 1193, 15
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safety of flight in.international air navigation." 2
ICAO's structure is quasi-legislative and bicameral in
nature. ICAO convenes an annual assembly, 3 which is comprised of the membership of contracting states (signatories of
the Chicago Convention) wishing to be present. 4 The ICAO
Assembly is responsible for the organization's financial and
budgetary policy, as well as for amending the Convention.1 5 A
component of the ICAO Assembly is the ICAO Council. That
body is made up of representatives from twenty-one contracting states, elected by the Assembly every three years."6 The
Council submits annual reports to the Assembly," "[r]equest[s],
collect[s], examine[s] and publish[es] information relating to
the advancement of air navigation and the operation of international air services," 8 and, of importance to the issue examined in this Note, is responsible for the operations and recommendations of the Air Navigation Commission, created by
Article 56," which is empowered to "[c]onsider, and recommend... modifications of the Annexes to [the] Convention." 0
While the Five Freedoms outlined above were not adopted
at the Chicago Convention, Article 5 of the Convention did
permit contracting states to "make flights iito" each others'

U.N.T.S. 295, 326.
12. Id. art. 44(h), 61 Stat. 1180, 1193, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 326. While ICAO sur-

vives today as the Chicago Convention's sole lasting contribution to the field of
civil aviation law, its creation was not the Convention's sole intent. One commentator notes that "[diespite its vast ambitions, the Chicago Convention essentially
consists of the statement of general principles . . . and the skeleton of a code of
conduct which could govern international air transport." JACQUES NAVEAU, INTER-

NATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT IN A CHANGING WORLD 34 (1989) (emphasis added). For
a more detailed discussion of ICAO's safety criteria and the U.S. application of
these, see infra Parts II and IV.

13. See Chicago Convention, supra note 2, arts. 48, 49, 61 Stat. 1180, 1193-94,
15 U.N.T.S. 295, 328-29 (outlining the composition and duties of the ICAO Assembly).
14. Action by the ICAO Assembly cannot be taken unless a quorum, defined
as a majority of the contracting states, is present. See id. art. 48(b), (c) 61 Stat.
1180, 1193-94, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 328.
15. See id. art. 49(e), (), (j), 61 Stat. 1180, 1194, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 330.
16. See id. art. 50(a), 61 Stat. 1180, 1195, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 330.
17. See id. art. 54(a), 61 Stat. 1180, 1196, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 334.
18. Id. art. 54(i) 61 Stat. 1180, 1196, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 334.
19. Id. art. 56, 61 Stat. 1180, 1197-98, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 336-37.
20. Id. art. 57(a) 61 Stat. 1180, 1198, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 338. For an analysis
of the Annexes, particularly those surrounding the routing and safety issues studied here, see JAMES R. Fox, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
AvIATION: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE, Booklet No. 8 (1994).

1998]

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION

969

territories "and to make stops for non-traffic purposes without
the necessity of obtaining prior permission ... ."" Furthermore, although the United States for many years strictly regulated its own domestic aviation market,22 it did press for liberal
treatment of routing in the bilateral agreements it pursued
with foreign nations." The agreement struck between the United States and Great Britain at Bermuda in 1946 (Bermuda I)'
is considered the most notable of these.25 Bermuda I reflected a
compromise among the two signatories, with a view toward
restrictive pricing schemes advocated by Britain on the one
hand, and toward liberal routing arrangements favored by the
United States on the other.2 Bermuda rs two provisions were
especially significant in regard to routing arrangements. First,
there is the spirit of the Chicago Convention as expressed in a
supplementary document, which mandates a "fair and equal
opportunity for the carriers of the two nations to operate on
any route between their respective countries,"27 and, second,
the text of the accord itself specifically envisioned the emergence of a subsequent multilateral accord which would effectively absorb its own provisions.2 8
Bermuda I appears to be the controlling model for the
ever-multiplying series of bilateral civil aviation agreements
among nations over the next three decades. Its seemingly
anticipated descendant, a multilateral regime of regulation,

21. Chicago Convention, supra note 2, art. 5, 61 Stat. 1180, 1181, 15 U.N.T.S.
295, 298-99. The term "non-traffic" has been interpreted to mean non-scheduled
flights. See Stockfish, supra note 5, at 605.
22. Section 501(b)(1) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, for instance, prohibits foreign citizens from holding a controlling interest in a U.S. air carrier. 49
U.S.C.A. §44102(a)(1)(A). This provision, which remains U.S. law, has been rightly
characterized as being "in tension with the evolving landscape of civil aviation."
Thomas D. Grant, Foreign Takeovers of United States Airlines: Free Trade Process,
Problems, and Progress, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 63, 131 (1994).
23. See Stockfish, supra note 5, at 608.
24. Agreement Relating to Air Services Between Their Respective Territories,
Feb. 11, 1946, U.S.-U.K, 60 Stat. 1499 [hereinafter Bermuda I].
25. See Abeyratne, supra note 10, at 806.
26. See id. at 805-06.
27. Resolutions of Committee II (ad hoc), in STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, AIR LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD at 1442, 1443
(Comm. Print 1961).
28. The treaty would be amended in order to "conform" to any subsequent
multilateral agreement. Id. art. 11, 60 Stat. 1499, 1502.
29. See Abeyratne, supra note 8, at 806.
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never did emerge, however. 3' This failing, coupled with a growing tendency by increasing numbers of countries to abuse Bermuda I's framework by "adopt[ing] an unduly restrictive stance
on their sovereignty in airspace," 1 rendered the model of
treaty-making contemplated at Bermuda obsolete by the mid1970s.3 2 The United States almost instantly responded to the
void created by the obsolescence of Bermuda I-not directly by
international treaty, but implicitly through domestic industrial
reform-by enacting the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.33
With this sweeping legislation-which, in many eyes, turned
regulation of its domestic aviation industry on its head 4 -the
United States abandoned the restrictive pricing philosophy of
Bermuda I, while retaining the prior agreement's permissiveness on routing. By one account, the United States entered
into new agreements-or amended existing ones-in eleven
instances within the first two years of the statute's passage.35
The U.S. success in fanning the flames of open market routing
was limited, however. Although hardly reluctant to entertain
free trade initiatives in most, if not all, industries, neither the
Reagan nor Bush administrations were able to conclude another "full-scale" bilateral agreement with liberal routing provisions.36 Even the rush of success which followed the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 carried little geographic diversity.

30. See generally, E. Tazewell Ellett, International and U.S. Legal and Policy
Impediments to the Growth of the Airline Industry: Time For A Change in the
World Order? AIR & SPACE LAW., Winter 1991, at 3, 3 (observing that "the slowness of progress in the evolution of [the present] international civil aviation legal
and policy framework, due in large part to the laborious and time-consuming process of bilateral government-to-government negotiations, stands in stark contrast to
the rapid and efficient progress of the airline business community in taking bold
steps to adapt to the global marketplace environment and to improve the scope
and quality of services to the traveling public.").
31. Abeyratne, supra note 10, at 806.
32. See id. at 807.
33. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.).
34. See generally Paul Stephen Dempsey, The State of the Airline, Airport &
Aviation Industries, 21 TRANSP. L.J. 129, 152 (1992) (noting that "[wihatever the
truth on whether deregulation has benefitted consumers, its impact on the industry itself has been profound.").
35. See Seth M. Warner, Comment, Liberalize Open Skies: Foreign Investment
and Cabotage Restrictions Keep Noncitizens in Second Class, 43 AM. U. L. REV.
277, 290 (1993).
36. See Stockfish, supra note 5, at 618.
37. The new liberal bilaterals which immediately followed U.S. domestic dereg-
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The slowing of such success can reasonably be attributed not to
the reluctance of the United States to pursue such a policy, but
to "the reduced number of like-minded partners with whom to
negotiate liberal bilateral agreements." 8 Nevertheless, as the
Cold War ended, the generally liberal U.S. view on international civil aviation routing remained largely intact and traceable
to its intentions at the Chicago Convention nearly four decades
before.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE ICAO SAFETY REGIME, THE U.S.
APPLICATION THEREOF, AND THE SANCTIONING OF CIVIL
AVIATION AS A TOOL OF COLD WAR FOREIGN POLICY

Annexes 1 through 18 of the Chicago Convention outline
the safety standards which ICAO is charged with enforcing."9
Within these provisions, Annexes 640 and 84' are of special
importance.42 Annex 6 introduces "basic rules for the operation
of aircraft such as the equipment requirements for particular
kinds of flight, maintenance requirements and fuel minimums. ' Annex 6, for instance, includes the requirement that
passengers be instructed regarding the use of seat belts. Annex
6 also establishes a regime of minimum flight altitudes flown
and ensures that all personnel involved in the conduct of an
international flight be familiar with the aviation laws of for-

ulation were noticeably concentrated, geographically, with northern European nations. "Serious resistance" was encountered throughout much of the rest of the
globe. Id. at 617. The political and philosophic underpinnings for such resistance
are: (i)the persistence of states in viewing their national carrier or carriers "as
essential public utilities deserving of government protection," and (ii) the disproportionate bargaining power between a nation such as the United States and most
smaller countries less receptive to Open Skies and who "would have difficulty in
matching the large market and powerful airlines of the United States, and would
naturally resist the relaxation of restrictions in its bilateral." Id. at 635.
38. Id. at 618.
39. See NAVEAU, supra note 12, at 56. The Annexes do not appear alongside
the original text of the Chicago Convention and are "republished from time to
time" by ICAO. Id. For a summary of the Annexes, see Fox, supra, note 20, Booklet No. 8 (1994).
40. See FOX, supra note 20, at 18.
41. See id. at 20.
42. See also Mark Lee Morrison, Note and Comment, Navigating the Tumultuous Skies of InternationalAviation: The Federal Aviation Administration's Response
to Non-Compliance with International Safety Standards, 2 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM.
621, 631 (1995).
43. FOX, supra note 20, at 18.
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eign countries over which the flight travels."
Annex 8 sets forth "minimum standards for the design and
construction of aircraft so that all Contracting States will recognize the airworthiness certificates of all other Member
States having confidence in their design and inspection regimes." 5 Annex 8 also focuses upon structure and design features of aircraft and defines "anticipated operating conditions"
as
"those conditions which are known from experience or which
can reasonably be envisaged to occur during the operational
life of the aircraft taking into account the operations for
which the aircraft is made eligible, the conditions so considered being relative to the meteorological state of the atmosphere, to the configuration of the terrain, to the functioning
of the aircraft, to the efficiency of the personnel and to all
factors affecting safety in flight.""s
The Air Navigation Committee of ICAO is responsible for effecting, and in many instances, has implemented, changes in
the technical
and procedural language of these and other an47
nexes.
Even though the Chicago Convention's vision for ICAO
was for it to assume regulatory supremacy in all areas of civil
aviation, including trade," as a practical matter its influence
has long been restricted to that of a standard-bearer for signatory nations' air safety.49 A large part of the credit (or blame)
for this reality lies at the doorstep of the United States, which
did not want a centralized, inter-governmental organization
imposing economic regulation on civil aviation. 0 ICAO naturalized a legal bond with the European Civil Aviation Conference
in 1956;5' established a "close liaison" with the African Civil
44. See id.
45. Id. at 20.
46. Id. at 21.
47. Annex 8, for instance, has been amended 95 times in the first 39 years
following its original drafting in 1949. See id. at 22.
48. ICAO's envisioned role as a stimulus for concluding a multilateral accord
on commercial air rights failed not long after the signing of the Chicago Convention in 1947. See MAREK ZYLICZ, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT LAW 85 (1992).
49. See NAVEAU, supra note 12, at 57.
50. See ZYLICZ, supra note 48, at 86.
51. See id. at 110.
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Aviation Commission, created in 1969;52 and had its multilateral regulatory objectives embraced by the Latin American Civil
Aviation Commission, established in 1973."3
After ICAO became a special agency of the United Nations," however, its influence waned drastically.55 The chief
reason for this decline, not surprisingly, was ICAO's lack of an
effective enforcement mechanism.56 Some sort of an inspection
procedure to assure compliance with ICAO standards among
its constituent countries is needed.57 Ultimately, then, ICAO
could reasonably be taken to task for developing a verification
system, but it has failed to do so.58 Even in the absence of
these deficiencies, ICAO would, moreover, still be forced to
develop an enforcement regime that would ensure compliance;59 this, too, ICAO has failed to do. Although the notion of
strengthening ICAO to its envisioned supremacy (not only in
the area of technical regulation," but in the heretofore forbidden area of trade)6 continues to enjoy support, it has largely
remained hamstrung, not simply by the presence of a wary
United States, and not because of the enormous task of overseeing a huge worldwide aviation infrastructure,62 but by its
own administrative deficiency. ICAO has been observed to lack
"the statutory power to impose measures on Contracting States
in a number of areas where, in fact, the Convention itself has
left these States with full authority [sic] of decisions, and subsequent arrangements have established the quasi-discretional
powers of governments in dealing with economic factors."63

52. See id. at 111.
53. See id. at 112. The Latin American Civil Aviation Commission adopted
most of the resolutions made at the "Conferencias Regionales de Aviaci6n Civil"
held at Rio de Janeiro (1959), Montevideo (1960) and Bogotd (1962). Id. at 111-12.
54. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 2, at 7.

55. See Morrison, supra note 42, at 631.
56. See id. at 623.
57. See id. at 632.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 633.
60. See, e.g., NAVEAU, supra note 12, at 57.
61. See Craig Canetti, Note, Fifty Years after the Chicago Conference: A Proposal for Dispute Settlement Under the Auspices of the International Civil Aviation
Organization, 26 LAW & POLVY INT'L Bus: 497, 497 (1995).

62. In the area of mapping sophistication, for instance, ICAO "concedes that
it's a big job to get the world flying by the same mapping rules." Susan Carey,
New Surveys Needed for World's Airports, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1996, at B8B.
63. NAVEAU, supra note 12, at 57.
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Moreover, ICAO's status as the standard forum to resolve disputes under member states' bilateral aviation agreements-a
status dating to Bermuda I-has been weakened." The United States, for example, employs an ad hoc tribunal as the dispute resolution authority in most of its aviation tribunals."5
Finally, the International Court of Justice has proven to be of
little help in this area, likewise owing to an uncertain enforcement mechanism.66
This trend was interrupted, modestly, in 1995 when the
67
ICAO Assembly ratified a limited safety oversight program,
but its mandate was severely constrained. First, assessments
were to be conducted only upon the request of a member nation;68 and second, it continued to lack enforcement punch.69 Al-

64. See PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, LAW & FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL
AvIATION 72, 74 (1987).

65. See id. at 74.
66. See-John H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, InternationalLaw and Institutions
for a New Age, 81 GEO. L.J. 535, 541 (1993). A notable aviation case which came
before the International Court of Justice [hereinafter I.C.J.], however, was Aerial
Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.) 1996 I.C.J. 9 (Feb. 22), arising from the
shooting down.of an Iranian civilian airliner in the Persian Gulf by the U.S. naval
carrier Vincennes. The United States contended that the Vincennes' commander
was operating under a good-faith belief that the Iranian aircraft was hostile. See
David K. Linnan, Iran Air Flight 655 and Beyond: Free Passage, Mistaken SelfDefense, and State Responsibility, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 245, 260 (1991). Iran, in its
application to the I.C.J., cited both the Chicago Convention and the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.
Application Instituting Proceedings (Iran v. U.S.) (Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988),
28 I.L.M. 843 (1989). In essence, Iran was appealing an ICAO Council decision
report that had, inter alia, expressed "profound regret over the loss of 290
lives . . . " and "[u]rged all States to take all necessary action for the safety of

navigation of civil aircraft, particularly by assuring effective co-ordination of civil
and military activities .

. . ."

International Civil Aviation Organization, Resolution

and Report Concerning the Destruction of Iran Air Airbus on July 3, 1988, 28
I.L.M. 896, 899 (1989). The I.C.J. never ruled in this case, noting only that the
parties had agreed to settle the dispute out of court. See Aerial Incident of 3 July
1988, 1996 I.C.J. 9, 10. It was reported that the settlement stipulated that the
United States would pay as much as $300,000 to relatives of each Iranian passenger killed as a result of the incident. See U.S. and Iran Settle Financial Claims;
$132 Million Agreement Covers 1988 Airbus Downing, Banking Disputes, WASH.
POST, Feb. 23, 1996, at A23. Another problem with the I.C.J.'s jurisdiction in the
area of aviation law is the existence of publicists who "tend to argue that the
downing of civil aircraft over a state's territory is more properly characterized as a
human rights problem." Linnan, supra, at 386-87.
67. See David Hughes, U.S., Europe Back ICAO Safety Oversight Program, AV.
WI. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 30, 1995, at 47 available in 1995 WL 10192974.

68. See id.
69. Under the plan ratified by ICAO, '[tihe final safety report will detail any
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though ICAO's leadership continues to whisper of building on
this concept to the present day,"° a revisiting of the program
shows that such aspirations should be received with a high
degree of skepticism.7
Since ICAO has been, and, for the foreseeable future probably will be, silent in the area of enforcement, the United
States has emerged as the niaost aggressive enforcer of its own
bilateral air accords. Reprisals, as well as other retributive
processes, have been "widely applied in the United States
where legislation has been enacted providing for a large choice
of measures to restrict foreign airlines in response to what the
U.S. Administration may see as discriminatory, anti-competitive or restrictive, or simply unreasonable practices affecting
U.S. airlines abroad."72 Through 1984, Congress had delegated such authority to rulemaking and other administrative
procedures conducted by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), an
independent Federal agency."3 The following year, most of the
CAB's authority was transferred, under Section 403(a) of the
Federal Aviation Act, to the Department of Transportation
(DOT). 4 Much of the old CAB's authority today resides within
one section of the DOT, the FAA." During the Cold War, repriarea in which the member country is not complying with ICAO Standards and
Recommended Practices. The member nation may then decide whether to take
remedial action with ICAO assistance." Id. (emphasis added).
70. See James Ott, Civil Aviation Directors to Explore Expanded Safety Role
for ICAO, AV. W. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 18, 1997, at 41 available in 1997 WL
8282232 (quoting ICAO Council president Assad Kotaite as previously stating his
goal that ICAO "become the worldwide authority of safety and security standards
for international civil aviation.").
71. Upon its inception in 1995, the ICAO safety assessment program was expected to cover a broad range of technical standards, "includ[ing] record keeping
practices, safety policies and compliance with airworthiness directives." Hughes,
supra note 67, at 47. But nearly two years later, the project, known as the Safety
Oversight Program, remained "restricted to three areas of ICAO annexes: licensing
of pilots, aircraft technical operations and airworthiness" and the notion that "audits be expanded to embrace air traffic services and airport infrastructures, facilities and services" has only just been suggested. Ott, supra note 70, at 41.
72. Reprisals, in this context, mean "retaliatory acts that by themselves are
contrary to international obligations of a country but are reciprocating illegal acts
of another party." ZYLICZ, supra note 48, at 43.
73. See generally Bert W. Rein, DOT'S CONTINUING REGULATORY OVERSIGHT

OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY, at 7, 7 (PLI, Comm. L. & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 425, 1987).
74. Transfer, Removal, and Reissuance of Regulations to Transportation Department, 50 Fed. Reg. 451 (1985).
75. See NAVEAU, supra note 12, at 82-83.
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sals were implemented by the United States, not merely for
trade reasons, but as an exercise of anti-Soviet foreign poli76
cy.
When analyzed, it becomes clear that the American imposition of air sanctions against Poland in the early 1980s was
implemented "for reasons completely unrelated to the aviation
relationship between the two countries."7 7 In 1981, with the
Jaruzelski government in Warsaw issuing martial law in order
to crack down on a fledgling labor movement and the neighboring Soviets threatening military intervention, President Reagan first expressed an intention to suspend aviation ties with
Poland in December of that year.7' Not long thereafter, it was
the President, not the CAB (which was only informed of the
action by the State Department, rather than the White House)
who ordered the immediate suspension of operating rights for
the Polish airline LOT in the United States.79 The ultimate reestablishment of a U.S.-Polish aviation relationship was facilitated not through either litigation or arbitration pursuant
to a pre-existing accord" but, in fact, was conditioned by the
Poles' willingness to forfeit these very types of procedural options which had been under consideration by their government. 1
Air sanctioning by the United States was used as a weapon directly against the Soviet Union as well. Subsequent to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the United States
began to crack down on incoming and outgoing Aeroflot flights,
though in much more incremental fashion than in the Poland

76. One commentator observes that the United States imposed aviation sanc-

tions on the Soviet Union for conduct unrelated to aviation, and in so doing,

"use[d] the aviation sector as the arrow for the bow." Gary E. Davidson, United
States' Use of Economic Sanctions, Treaty Bending, and Treaty Breaking in Inter.
national Aviation, 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 291, 340 (1993).
77. Id. at 304. The United States and Poland had concluded a bilateral agreement governing civil aviation in 1972. Air Transport Agreement, July 19, 1972,
U.S.-Pol., 23 U.S.T. 4271 [hereinafter U.S.-Poland Air Transport Agreement].
78. Transcript of Reagan's Remarks on Suspension of Some Ties with Poland,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1981, at A10.
79. Suspension of LOT flights actually took effect December 31, 1981, eight
days after Reagan's speech evincing this intent. U.S. Ban on Aeroflot Formally
Takes Effect, N.Y. TnIES, Jan. 6, 1982, at A7 [hereinafter Ban on Aeroflot].
80. U.S.-Poland Air Transport Agreement, supra note 77, art. 13, 23 U.S.T.
4271, 4276.
81. See Davidson, supra note 76, at 307.
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case.82 First, weekly round-trips operated by the Soviet carrier in and out of New York and Washington were cut by onethird." Secondly, the United States allowed the original 1966
bilateral treaty on aviation with the Soviet Union" to lapse,
and despite CAB's assumption that further negotiations would
occur, none ever did." All U.S. bound flights were banned by
the CAB, under Presidential edict, in January 1982.86 The
chokehold became even tighter after a Korean civilian airliner
was shot down over Russian airspace in 1983 by Soviet air
forces." This caused the Reagan CAB to suspend Aeroflot's
right to vend air services in the United States, to preclude
carriage of traffic by American carriers where Aeroflot was on
the itinerary, and to prohibit such carriers from accepting
Aeroflot tickets or shipping documents. Ss
The profile of U.S. international civil aviation safety regulation at the dawn of the 1990s was somewhat low-key, but
nonetheless bore implications for its Five Freedoms ideology.
Although there was assuredly some sanction-making on the
part of the CAB and the early FAA against foreign countries
which could not have been considered to present safety problems, "such actions were taken on a nation-by-nation basis
when applied to the bilateral accords the United States had
struck with a target country. But the CAB, certainly, was a
ready resource for more politically "sexy" conflicts and would

82. See id. at 297.
83. See id.; Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. Warns of New Responses to Soviet Over
Afghanistan as Moscow Defends Its Role, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1980, at Al.
84. Civil Air Transport Agreement, Nov. 4, 1966, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 17 U.S.T.
1909.
85. See Davidson, supra note 76, at 298.
86. See Ban on Aeroflot, supra note 79.
87. See Robert D. McFadden, U.S. Says Soviet Downed Korean Airliner; 269
Lost; Reagan Denounces Wanton' Act, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1983, at Al.
88. See Text of Reagan's Letter to C.B. Chairman, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1983,
at A10. Aeroflot did not reintroduce service into the United States until 1986. See
Davidson, supra note 76, at 300. It is somewhat ironic that despite the no-nonsense foreign policy of the Reagan Administration in the wake of the downing of
Korean Air Lines Flight KE 007, a unanimous Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Justice Scalia (a Reagan appointee), would later impose severe restrictions on the
ability of wrongful death plaintiffs to recover compensatory damages pursuant to
the Warsaw Convention. The Court applied municipal U.S. law. See Zicherman v.
Korean Air Lines, 116 S. Ct. 629, 637 (1996) (concluding that "Articles 17 and
24(2) of the Warsaw Convention permit compensation only for legally cognizable
harm, but leave the specification of what harm is legally cognizable to the domestic law applicable under the forum's choice-of-law rules.").
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be utilized in circumstances where there was not even a question (or at least not a raised one) of bilateral violation, and,
ergo, as a tool of U.S. Cold War foreign policy.89
ICAO, for its part, was essentially an unchallenged leader
in terms of international regulation, but a decidedly weak
one." Although it did continue to provide organizational linkage to a majority of regions around the world, it failed to supply the stimulus for the long-sought multilateral regime and
could not be taken seriously as an enforcer of air safety, for
precisely the reason that it could not enforce.
III. FROM THE FIVE FREEDOMS TO OPEN SKIES: THE U.S.
CONTINUES TO CHAMPION LIBERAL AIR ROUTING UPON THE
DEMISE OF THE COLD WAR
With the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union, and with it,
the Cold War, it is hardly surprising that the United States
now has further championed the Five Freedoms concept proposed at the Chicago Convention,"' at this point nearly half a
century old.
The precise definition and origin of the phrase "Open
Skies" is unclear. It has been interpreted by some to be an
antonym of the principle of a state's national sovereignty over
its own airspace, and therefore a subservient one under customary international law.92 In a more concrete sense, Open
Skies has been characterized as representing a specific type of
bilateral agreement which "at the minimum includes open
entry on routes, unrestricted capacity and frequency on routes,
and unrestricted traffic rights."93 Whatever its precise definition, Open Skies has become practically a slogan for current
U.S. routing policy-apparently a direct descendant of the

89. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 76, at 297 (discussing role of CAB in curtailing Aeroflot services to the United States).
90. See Morrison, supra note 42, at 631 (noting that "[diespite the ostensibly
extensive range of topics covered by the ICAO's standards, in practice the standards have proved to be very generalized and basic.").
91. See Stockfish, supra note 5, at 603.
92. See ZYLICZ, supra note 48, at 58-59.
93. Daniel C. Hedlund, Note, Toward Open Skies: Liberalizing Trade in International Airline Services, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 259, 263 n.22 (1994); see also
DEMPSEY, supra note 64, at 33 (characterizing the bilateral agreements negotiated
between the United States and the Benelux nations during the late 1970s as
"open skies.").
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Chicago Convention's Five Freedoms. The inability of the United States to obtain liberal bilateral agreements was ended in
1992 when it entered into an agreement amending the 1957

accord with the Netherlands,94 which set no limitations on

routing. 5 The Clinton Administration followed suit by introducing a plan entitled "Initiative to Promote a Strong Competitive Aviation Industry" in early 1994.96 That plan cited, as
one of its objectives, the "pursu[it of] liberal multilateral agreements."9 7 Federico Pefia, Secretary of Transportation during
President Clinton's first term, stated baldly in a 1995 Congres-

sional hearing that "[o]ur ultimate goal is complete liberaliza-

tion of the international aviation market."9 8 Also that year,
the DOT published the Model Bilateral Air Transport Agreement (hereinafter Open Skies Agreement),9 which specifically
identified thirteen Open Skies agreements concluded by the
United States during the last two years alone, all of these with
European nations, except for one concluded with Jordan.'
The features of the Open Skies Agreement include market
regulation of pricing, freedom of carriers to establish sales
offices and unlimited personnel related to air service in a foreign country; and, according to each party, the right of over-

flight. 1 1

94. Agreement Amending the Agreement of April 3, 1957, as Amended and
the Protocol of March 31, 1978, as Amended, Oct. 14, 1992, U.S.-Neth., T.I.A.S.
No. 11976.
95. Id. para. 3(1).
96. Administration Unveils Sweeping Aviation Initiatives, INSIDE D.O.T. &
TRANSP. WY-, Jan. 7, 1994, available in 1994 WL 2696611. See also U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., NEWS RELEASE, PENA, TYSON UNVEIL ADMINISTRATION AVIATION INITIA-

TIVE, Jan. 6, 1994, available in 1994 WL 3170 [hereinafter PENA, TYSON UNVEIL].
97. See PENA, TYSON UNVEIL, supra note 96.

98. InternationalAviation Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 104th Cong. 14
(1995) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Federico Pefia, Secretary of Transportation).
99. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., UNITED STATES: MODEL BILATERAL AIR TRANSPORT
AGREEMENT (1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 1479 (1996) [hereinafter OPEN SKIES

AGREEMENT].
100. Commentary to the OPEN SKIES AGREEMENT identifies the following countries as having signed Open Skies treaties with the United States between 1992
and 1995: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland,
Jordan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. See id.
at 1479.
101. A good overview of the Open Skies agreement can be obtained by examining its Content Summary as printed in the International Legal Materials. This
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This policy initiative commanded much bipartisan support
in the United States; the Open Skies concept was welcomed
not only by the White House, but also by the Republican dominated 104th Congress. °2 Even with the election resulting in
an executive and a legislature of different political parties in
1996,03 (notwithstanding the appointment of a new Trans-

portation Secretary)," 4 the U.S. course in international civil
aviation shows no signs of change.'
Nevertheless, Open Skies in international civil aviation
cannot yet be considered conceptually dominant. The evidence
on this point cannot be made more bare than by the limited
application of international air services to the GATS. While the
GATS does contain an Annex on Air Transport Services,' its
application is restricted to computer reservations systems, selling/marketing
of air transport services, and aircraft mainte07
nance.

One likely reason why negotiators to the World Trade
Organization-and, ultimately, the GATS-were forced to
scuttle comprehensive treatment of civil aviation within the
GATS,' O5 was the failure of the United States and the EU to
come to terms on a dispute involving subsidies." 9 Whereas
the United States insisted on the inclusion of language reflecting its longstanding reluctance to government intervention in
domestic aviation industries, the Europeans wanted such an
option preserved."0 An important recent illustration of the
ongoing impasse is the recent merger of the U.S. aircraft manufacturers Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, who were prime

Content Summary is reproduced in an appendix to this Note at p. 993.
102. See Hearings, supra note 98, at 1 (statement of Sen. McCain). See also
142 CONG. REC. S5376-77 (daily ed. May 20, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lott).
103. See, e.g., Dan Balz, Clinton Wins by Wide Margin; GOP Holding Edge in
Congress; President Beats Dole 2-1 in Electoral Tally, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1996,
at A01.
104. See, e.g., David Stout, Senate Easily Confirms Slater as Transportation
Secretary, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1997, at A3.
105. See Christopher Fotos, The Long and Winding Road to Open Skies, AV.
DAILY, Jan. 6, 1997, at 23.
106. See GATS Annex on Air Transport Services.
107. Id. para. 3(a)-(c).
108. See U.S., Europe Set Aside Aviation Dispute to Speed Uruguay Round, AV.
DAILY, Dec. 14, 1993, at 398.
109. Id.
110. See James Mathews, 1994 Outlook After Uruguay Round, Bilateral Negotiators Seek New Basis for Trust, AV. DAILY, Jan. 4, 1994, at 13.
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competitors of the leading European manufacturer, Airbus
Industrie."' Eleventh-hour negotiations had to be completed
before the European Commission backed off from formally
rejecting the joinder.'
The standoff in the GATS drafting negotiations only reinforces the important point that Open Skies, however noble a
theory, remains far from omnipresent."' The subsidy stalemate raised real concerns not only of the possibility of reaching
closure in the area of international aviation trade, but about
the workability of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade" 4 (GATT) if such a vital industry as civil aviation were
exempted from its provisions."'
The subsidy issue, however unrelated to the subject of
access addressed here, nonetheless reveals a cold, hard fact to
Open Skies proponents: obstacles to this ideal have yet to be
overcome." 6 And the counsel of one recent commentator is
clearly on point in addressing the status of Open Skies internationally; the omission of the Five Freedoms, coupled with a
general freedom to sell services, "creates a dichotomy that
must be resolved."" 7 Since the GATS Annex on Air Transportation Services does explicitly provide for the freedom to vend

111. See John D. Morrocco, Boeing, EU Resolve Dispute Over Merger Airbus Restructuring to Improve Competitiveness Looms Larger as it Squares Off Against
New U.S. Heavyweight, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., July 28, 1997, at 22, available in
1997 WL 8281969. The EU expressed deep concerns that a merged Boeing would
parlay McDonnell Douglas' longstanding ties to U.S. defense projects. Boeing, in
response, agreed to license patents obtained via government contracts to commercial manufacturers on a "nonexclusive, royalty-only basis." Boeing further withdrew
its status as "exclusive supplier" to U.S. carriers American, Delta and Continental
airlines. Id.
112. See id.
113. As far back as the Carter administration, there is evidence of European
opposition to Open Skies. CAB Chairman Alfred Kahn's response to this opposition
was "let's stick it to the Brits-let's put pressure on the Germans through Amsterdam." DEMPSEY, supra note 64, at 33.
114. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
115. See Shane Spradlin, Comment, The Aircraft Subsidies Dispute in the
GATT's Uruguay Round, 60 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1191, 1216-17 (1995).
116. See Abeyratne, supra note 10, at 836 (observing that "[s]ince GATS cannot
sustain air transport services within a bilateral framework, it now remains to be
seen whether the aviation community will move toward placing air traffic rights in
a multilateral or plurilateral system.").
117. Id. at 835.
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air services,"' the civil aviation portion therein begs the
question of how much regulation, if any, should be placed upon
the freedom of those services to operate internationally; an
issue already addressed by the Chicago Convention.'19
IV. ICAO STANDARDS AND U.S. ENFORCEMENT: THE FAA AS
AVIATION POLICEMAN

The direction of internationalization of civil aviation standards was altered sharply in 1992 with the FAA's creation of
the Foreign Aviation Safety Assessment Program (FASAP)."20
The FAA was authorized therein to conduct safety assessments
of foreign countries carriers through inspection, with a tripartite mechanism subsequently put in place to evaluate compliance: Category I (acceptable; the target country's carrier(s)
is/are allowed access to the United States); Category II (conditional; the target country's carrier(s) is/are subject to sanctions); and Category III (unacceptable; access is denied).' 2 ' A
more confusing aspect of FASAP was that for the first two
years of its application, lists of countries not in compliance
were not published on a regular basis.'22 But, of even more
import was the fact that under the new FASAP regime assessments of target countries would be grounded not on U.S. safety
standards, but on those of ICAO."s
From the emergence of FASAP, and the gleaning of ICAO
standards onto its procedures, the implication is clear: the

118. See GATS Annex on Air Transport Services.
119. See Abeyratne, supra note 10, at 835.
120. See Morrison, supra note 42, at 621. See also Information Concerning FAA

Procedures for Examining and Monitoring Foreign Air Carriers, 57 Fed. Reg.
38,342 (1992).

121. See Public Disclosure of the Results of Foreign Civil Aviation Authority
Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg. 46,332-33 (1994).
122. The first regular publication of a list of FASAP violators by the DOT
emerged during the late summer of 1994. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., NEWS RELEASE, DOT ANNOUNCES ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL SAFETY STANDARDS, available in 1994 WL 474689. Prior to that time, notice

was given indirectly, through the General Accounting Office. See, e.g., Glenn
Kessler, FAA Safety Checks Found Lax, GAO Cites Poor Oversight of Foreign Airlines, NEWSDAY, Dec. 23, 1992, at 7.
123. See Morrison, supra note 42, at 636. In a rare nod to ICAO, the United
States has not exercised its option to differ with the Montreal organization on
safety standards, though had it done so, it would have been required to notify
ICAO of the discrepancy and "provide full information on the differences and explanation of its reasons . . . ." NAVEAU, supra note 12, at 55.
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United States is today seeking to exert itself as the world's

policeman in civil aviation safety. Though it is true that Category II (conditional) or Category III (unacceptable) status and
their attendant penalties attach only to U.S. airspace," no
other country has taken regulation of a foreign carrier's access-in terms of safety-to such an extreme.'2 5 Another
clear implication of the change from prior international civil
aviation policy being conducted by the United States is that
the country is no longer conducting such policy on an extrinsic
treaty-bound basis.'2 6 Put another way, the inevitable legal
thrust of a negative FASAP finding is that the United States is
emphasizing treaty language which subjects foreign carriers to
U.S. laws; and not a "new law" being created in a bilateral
textual setting.'2 7 In essence, the emergence of FASAP shows
that the United States today has an inclination toward enjoying the fruits of its own victory-determined to keep ICAO
weak in the area of enforcement, FASAP has become roughly
its operational equivalent without changing its benchmarks
one bit. But this "success" may prove to be short-lived. The
traditional nemesis of the United States in civil aviation, the

124. See Morrison, supra note 42, at 635-36. A proponent of the FASAP model
nonetheless concedes that for its ultimate goal-the universalization of ICAO standards-to be truly effectuated, "the international community must join the United
States in developing and implementing programs similar to FASAP." Id. at 654-55.
125. See id. at 644 (contending that "[tihe United States should not be alone in
enforcing standards that are obligations of more than 180 countries.").
126. See Davidson, supra note 76, at 353 (pointing out that "Itihe United
States undermines the primacy of international law and the underlying purposes
of aviation bilateral agreements when it acts in contravention of those agreements
in the absence of substantial legal cause."). See also Morrison, supra note 42, at
635 (arguing that "[i]n lieu of the bilateral agreement, some enforcement mechanism is needed to ensure compliance with ICAO standards in those countries lacking any effective civil aviation authority.").
127. There is, however, a clear legal basis for the validity of FASAP under
Article 6 of the Chicago Convention which provides that "[n]o scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a contracting State,
except with the special permission or other authorization of that State, and in
accordance with the terms of such permission or authorization." Chicago Convention, supra note 2, art. 6, 61 Stat. 1180, 1182, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 300. Nonetheless,
it would be proper for observers of civil aviation law to approach the question of
whether a FASAP-affected party might withdraw from a pre-1992 bilateral with
the United States by characterizing the implementation of FASAP as a "fundamental change of circumstances . . . the effect of [which] is radically to transform the
extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty." See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23, 1969, art. 62(1)(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
347 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
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EU, is launching its own inspection program.'2 8

While the importance of placing an emphasis on air safety
cannot be denied and should not be overlooked, the effective
transfer, at least in terms of enforcement, of world air safety
policing from ICAO to the FAA presents political problems. As
can be seen from two examples, there can at least be questions
asked as to whether, given the foreign policy history governing
the Polish and Soviet experience, the United States is conducting FASAP assessments and rendering conclusions therefrom
in a manner consistent with the detached vision of ICAO contemplated at Chicago, or merely as an ongoing extension of its
foreign policy interests.
A principal controversy surrounding negative FASAP assessments is that they are geographically concentrated in specific areas of the globe. In Latin America and the Caribbean
alone, seventeen countries are classified as either Category II
or II.1"9 The problem with such concentration may well not
be substantive, but with such authority being exerted by the
world's pre-eminent superpower nation-state, it could well be
one of appearance. While poor economic conditions and unsophisticated technical infrastructure in these regions of the
world can undoubtedly increase the probability of an adverse
FASAP finding, 3 ' the FAA is nevertheless vulnerable to, and
has indeed been attacked on, the charge that its assessments
are, at least in part, politically motivated. 3 ' And, unlike the

128. In a plan presented to the representative transport ministers at Luxembourg on June 17, 1996, it was proposed that the European Commission (EC)
would "work with the European Civil Aviation Conference and the Joint Aviation
Authorities to define a comprehensive 'safety assessment procedure.'" EC Advocates
Improvements in Safety Information Sharing, AV. EUR., June 20, 1996, at 2, available in 1996 WL 10773246. This new oversight proposal is part of the EC's larger
scheme to unify its Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) into a unified, FAA-style
agency. See Michael A. Taverna, Europe Pushes Broader Oversight Role for JAA,
Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 18, 1997, at 44, available in 1997 WL 8282231.
The envisioned safety regulator, now styled as the European Aviation Safety Authority (EASA), came one step closer to birth last June upon approval by the
European Council of Ministers. See id.
129. See Stephen Fidler, Air Travel Safety Gap Widens in Latin America, FIN.
POST, May 8, 1996, at 50.
130. See id. (finding that 'there is strong evidence that even countries in the
FAA's top category have air traffic control and monitoring systems that are out of
date, inadequate rescue services, non-existent airport security and sometimes air
traffic controllers with only rudimentary command of the English language.").
131. The 1994 FAA ratings caused an uproar with Latin American governments. Notably both Russia and China were not on the list, while Israel and Jor-
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Cold War activities discussed above,"3 2 where the CAB acted
as a mere puppet of the Reagan Administration, the FAA has
been given a freer hand in shaping presidential directives
involving the use of economic sanctions. 3' A sharper focus of
the political motivation issue lies in recent aviation disputes
between the United States and both Colombia and Venezuela.
In August 1996, the Colombian government backed down
from its initial threats to thwart American Airlines from
reinstituting service between New York, Miami and Bogota,
and thus enter into a full-scale dispute over the terms of the
two countries' Civil Aviation Agreement. 34 But while American Airlines was allowed to resume operations, Colombia's
carriers were barred from being able to reciprocate, based on
that country's Category II rating. 3 ' At least one observer has
pointed out the possible connection between the American
Airlines access dispute and broader overtones lying at the
heart of recent tensions between the two countries on the subject of narcotics trafficking. '
At just about the time a "full-scale" tussle between the
United States and Colombia was being averted, Venezuela was
dropped from Category II to Category III, based upon the
FAA's conclusion that it had failed to "fix" the deficiencies

dan were rapidly upgraded from Category II. See id.
132. See discussion supra Part II.
133. A good example is found in the matter of Yugoslavia, where civil war
erupted during the Bush Administration. Following the announcement by the president of economic sanctions against the disintegrating Balkan nation, the DOT
determined independently that a total prohibition of air service between the two
countries was warranted. DOT Order Published Shutting Off U.S. Air Commerce
with Yugoslavia, AIR SAFETY WK., June 15, 1992, available in 1992 WL 2252364.
134. Air Transport Agreement, Oct. 24, 1956, U.S.-Col., 14 U.S.T. 429. The crux
of the dispute is based upon Colombia's insistence that American Airlines could
not automatically re-start a run that had been discontinued three years earlier
without submitting to public hearings pursuant to Colombian law. The DOT, which
backed American Airlines, contended that the 1956 accord contemplated no such
requirement. See id.; Dan Reed, Air Route Sanctions Threatened, Colombia Prohibits American Airlines Flight, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, July 6, 1996 (Business),
at 1, available in 1996 WL 5549503.
135. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, NEWS RELEASE, COLOMBIA AND UNITED
STATES CONCLUDE AVIATION TALKS, Aug. 23, 1996, available in 1996 WL 479574.

136. See Diana Jean Schemo, To Punish Colombia, U.S. May Revoke Air Route,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1996, § 1, at 4 (noting that the owner of Avianca, Colombia's
national carrier, was a strong supporter of Colombian president Ernesto Samper,
who was suspected by the Clinton Administration of accepting $6 million from
drug lords to finance his 1994 election campaign).
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which caused the conditional reclassification to the intermediate category nine months earlier.'37 Here again, an uncomfortable political background exists due to Venezuela's connection, though more indirect, with regional druglords."'
A temporary agreement postponing implementation of the
Category III finding was signed by Venezuela and the United
States on August 10, 1996,"' and the following month Transportation Secretary Pena announced (citing "significant" progress by Venezuela in air safety), that air service between the
two countries could be continued subject to Venezuela's continued Category II status. 4 ' Only a month prior to the onset of
the U.S.-Venezuela civil aviation dispute and simultaneous
with the American Airlines routing tension, a national antidrug commissioner in Venezuela was quoted as conceding that
4
one region of his country was a "drug traffickers' paradise," '
and an arrest of four drug traffickers in Venezuela in late July,
1996, revealed a Venezuelan region as a link on a route funneling Colombian drugs abroad.'
Thus, two practical problems exist for U.S. civil aviation
policy today: How can the United States proceed to encourage
a multilateral, or liberal bilateral, Open Skies regime, while at
the same time acting as the world's de facto aviation safety
policeman? And can its legitimacy in performing the latter
role-tenuous as it appears to be in some parts of the
world-be preserved in case of the emergence of drastic regional conflict? It is contended here that for the present time, the
FAA carries "excess baggage," and that GATS should be revis-

137. Safety Dispute Interrupts Air Service Between U.S. and Venezuela, AV.
DAILY, Aug. 9, 1996, at 227.
138. See, e.g., Venezuela: Police Await Extradition of Drug Boss From Colombia,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, June 13, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2261720.
139. See U.S., Venezuela Reach 30-day Agreement, AIR SAFETY WK., Aug. 19,
1996, available in 1996 WL 6948417. Among other provisions, the 30-day
agreement required Venezuela to 'provide 100 percent safety oversight of all Venezuelan aircraft flying to the U.S. [and to] develop a plan to meet the highest safety standards under the FAA's assessment program . . . ." Id.

140. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., NEWS RELEASE, VENEZUELA MAKES PROGRESS ON
AIR SAFETY; ITS AIRLINES MAY CONTINUE U.S. OPERATIONS, Sept. 24, 1996, available in 1996 WL 538240.
141. John Wade, Drug Runners Find El Dorado in Orinoco Delta, GUARDIAN,
July 5, 1996, at 17 (quoting Johan Obdola, director of the regional office of
Venezuela's national anti-drug commission).

142. See FOUR ARRESTED IN VENEZUELAN DRUG BUST, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
July 29, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3897131.
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ited somehow (acknowledging the subsidy difficulty) to take a
more inclusive view of both Open Skies and aviation safety.
CONCLUSION

The most casual observer of the academic literature will
note an overwhelming emergence of commentary arguing that
the vision of Open Skies can be realized only with the collapse
of the "outdated and ill-equipped" bilateral regime in international civil aviation. This scholarly trend is completely understandable, for although there remain conceptual benefits to
the idea of bilateralism, particularly the better forum for the
achievement of compromise,'
the anomaly created by the
GATS-i.e., the inclusion of freedom of marketing services
without the freedom to route them, demands some type of
multilateral response. But for the reasons shown here, it is
virtually impossible to imagine bilateralism dying a quiet
death when: (1) at least in the area of safety, the rest of the
world implicitly operates at the pleasure, not of ICAO, but of a
signatory to the Chicago Convention, its "birth certificate;" and
(2) the emergence of a powerful transnational unit such as the
European Unit renders the probability that any future dealings
between the United States and the Europeans will, though
logically multilateral in impact, work legally in a bilateral
fashion. "5
In the area of safety, the debate is a bit more robust. Some
commentators are quick to highlight the risk of political abuse
inherent in FASAP procedures;'" others not only defend

143. Ellett, supra note 30, at 8; see also Hedlund, supra note 93, at 296;
Howard E. Kass, Note, Cabotage and Control: Bringing 1938 U.S. Aviation Policy
into the Jet Age, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INTL. L. 143, 180 (1994) (advocating the use
of "plurilateral" agreements in international civil aviation, which are agreements
officially ratified by two contracting states but which others can agree to follow).
144. ZYLICZ, supra note 48, at 142.
145. One of the major hurdles which the United States and the European Community failed to clear in resolving the Uruguay Round subsidy impasse was to
build upon an agreement signed between the two parties in 1992. See Spradlin,
supra note 115, at 1208-12 (citing Agreement Concerning the Application of the

GATT Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, July
17, 1992, U.S.-E.C. (on file with the Office of the United States Trade Representative, available in 1992 WL 466106).
146. See Irene E. Howie, The New Aviation Agenda: Spotlight on Safety Panel,
AIR & SPACE LAW., Spring 1995, at 16, 16 (reporting on a panel of experts
brought together to debate and discuss issues of aviation safety). See also Theo-
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FASAP, but also cite terrorism as a justification for the continued exertion of U.S. administrative and even military muscle
in regulating safety." 7 What is utterly astonishing, however,
is that the "free traders " " ' and "safety firsters" " are talk"ing to themselves, not one another. It is here where alternate
proposals are raised to achieve the mutually desirable goals of
Open Skies and enhanced safety.
The first alternative is to give ICAO organizational
"teeth." Although ICAO does retain great support from many
globalists in civil aviation,' 50 proposals advanced in the literature to "impose" ICAO on the world community are both naive and impractical. One such proposal is to merge GATT's
dispute resolution framework with ICAO's structure."' Flying in the face of this notion, however, are contrasting realities. On the one hand, there is the GATS vision, wherein panelists are to serve in an individual capacity, and not in the
service of governments.'52 This vision, however, runs directly
counter to the starkly political composition of ICAO. As a United Nations unit, only states, not organizational entities, are
allowed representation in ICAO's Assembly under the Chicago
Convention.153 Only states, therefore, are eligible to elect
members of ICAO Council, the unit's executive body. 54 Nevdore Edward Rokita, Comment, Why U.S.-Enforced InternationalFlight Suspension
Due to Deficient Foreign Airport Security Should Be a No-Go, 5 IND. INVL &
COMP. L. REv. 205, 232 (1994) (criticizing DOT suspension of U.S.-Nigeria flights
under the Foreign Airport Security Act of 1958 as "grantfing] a vague authority to
the DOT Secretary that enables he or she to act without accurately gauging the
public interest.").
147. See, e.g., Shirlyce Manning, Comment, The United States' Response to
InternationalAir Safety, 61 J. AIR L. & Com. 505, 537-38 (1995).
148. As used here, the term "free traders" refers to authors and commentators
in the field of civil aviation law who advocate overhauling either protectionist
hindrances to the Open Skies framework or the longstanding bilateral norm in
international civil aviation agreements. See discussion supra Part III.
149. As used here, the term "safety firsters" refers to authors and commentaters in the field of civil aviation law who advocate the U.S. lead in bargaining
routing rights of foreign carriers in exchange for bringing their national civil aviation infrastructure up to ICAO standards as monitored by the FAA through
FASAP. See discussion supra Part IV.
150. See, e.g., NAVEAU, supra note 12, at 57.
151. See Canetti, supra note 61, at 515-22.
152. Id. at 519.
153. See Chicago Convention, supra note 2, art. 48(b), 61 Stat. 1180, 1194, 15
U.N.T.S. 295, 328.
154. Id. art. 50, 61 Stat. 1180, 1195, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 330. A critical oversight
in the remedy proposed by Canetti, is.
the hypothesis that the principle of majority
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ertheless, the attractiveness of a revitalized ICAO cannot be
denied, especially when considering the universal adherence to
its safety edicts, there would be no need to revisit the standards question. These are respected-legally, if not functionally-worldwide, 155 and even critics of the U.S. FASAP model
speak only to the procedure, not the benchmark. 5 ' A better
way of reforming ICAO is to "depoliticize" it through amending
its membership requirements to cover not simply signatory
nation-states, but representatives of the airline and aerospace
manufacturing industries, as well as consumer advocates. This
broader patchwork of membership would allow ICAO to appear
less menacing to reluctant states, even the United States, who
would doubtlessly welcome private sector representation alongside administrators, while at the same time gratifying the
Europeans and Third World community, who are anxious to
see an entity other than the United States dominate international civil aviation. This "partnership" model is, moreover,
illustrative of what is really the only way to get past the purported bilateral "menace"-to give the subject matter greater
focus and the bargaining parties less, particularly in an area
such as civil aviation where the scope of the industry is enormous but the number of central players in the community of
nations to the field is few. In addition, by allowing ICAO to
speak with the voice not simply of governments, but of industry leaders, it could much better deal with its longstanding
resource problem, particularly in ensuring compliance with
safety standards. A step in this direction would be to reorganize ICAO by, in part, merging it with the International Air
Transport Association (IATA).
Founded in 1945, IATA is an international organization
composed of airlines certified to operate scheduled routes withrule embodied in ICAO Council would immunize it from being paralyzed by virtual
veto powers. Canetti, supra note 61, at 518-19. In fact, a reverse problem analogous to a corporate notion--tyranny of the majority"--could well obtain. Conceivably the world's preeminent aviation powers (the United States, Japan and the EU
countries) outvoted by coalitions of Third World Chicago Convention signatories,
particularly on safety issues where their suspicions of politically-motivated judgments have already become apparent. See Fidler, supra note 129, at 50.
155. See ZYLICZ, supra note 48, at 84 (observing that the "system of international standards and recommended practices, based on an increasing number of
Annexes to the [Chicago] Convention.. . has been very successful in ensuring a
steadily higher degree of uniformity of national regulations and practices.").
156. See Howie, supra note 146, at 16.
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in nations which are members of ICAO.'57 Its most influential function is its role in fare-setting, a role assigned to it as a
consequence of Bermuda .158 But even merging the IATA
with ICAO would leave important actors in the civil aviation
framework without a voice. These include domestic aviation
regulators, airport officers, and agents representing civil aviation personnel. This perhaps radical vision of ICAO, simply
does not square with the Chicago Convention. While ICAO's
Council is within its power, under Article 49(j), to make such a
change, 59 it is unlikely to commit this form of structural selfmutilation. A clear reminder of this point is provided by one
commentator in referring to ICAO's longstanding weakness as
a dispute resolution unit: "it is a political body comprised of
governmental representatives appointed for their technical,
administrative or diplomatic skills rather than their legal
abilities. Hence, they do not possess that measure of independence and autonomy of an unbiased neutral decision maker
that one normally expects of a judge."6 ' Realistically, therefore, the sort of medicine proposed here is probably too drastic
for the parties involved.
A second alternative makes better common sense: reworking GATS through either forcing the United States and EU to
return to the bargaining table to work out the subsidy stalemate or at least by getting them to agree to shelve subsidy
from the GATS treatment without sacrificing the whole scope
of civil aviation to bring Open Skies into line with other service sales. The experience of the GATS, as currently read, may
well make academic calls for this revisit simply that. Consider,
for example, a Category III country carrier under FASAP
claiming the right 'to sell tickets within the United States
which is then sued by a U.S. carrier which flies to that country. This, of course, could finally break the bilateral barrier
and make proposals for multilateralism suddenly meaningful.
Indeed, forcing civil aviation treatment into the GATS whole-

157. See DEMPSEY, supra note 64, at 13.
158. Bermuda I, supra note 24, Annex, § 1I(b). Note that the United States,
consistent with its reluctance to cede regulatory controls of any sort to transnational authority, was originally opposed to this provision. See DEMPSEY, supra note
64, at 14.
159. Chicago Convention, supra note 2, art. 49(j), 61 Stat. 1180, 1194, 15
U.N.T.S. 295, 330.
160. DEMPSEY, supra note 64, at 300 (citation omitted).
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sale may ultimately come, not in spite of the stubbornness of
the United States and EU on subsidy, but because of it. Civil
aviation's absence from the most comprehensive free trade
compact in history will have at least as much impact on the
GATS as it will the health of the industry. 6 ' Skeptics who
would contend that neither the United States nor the Europeans will ever budge on this issue need only be reminded of the
regime of carrier liability inaugurated by the Warsaw Convention,'6 2 which "balance[d] the interests of the passenger and
the air carrier" by limiting carriers' presumed liability with a
fixed ceiling on the amount of such obligations.'63 Under an
Intercarrier Agreement addressing passenger liability, adopted
in October, 1995 by representatives of the six regions of
IATA,' a major breakthrough was accomplished by dropping
the damage ceiling while restricting the ability of injured
plaintiffs to "forum shop" in the absence of such limits.'6 5
But this integration must not be the sole remedy. Safety
remains a concern-and while safety is grounds for a member
nation's exercise of veto power under the GATS, 6 6-- the matter of standards remains solely in ICAO's hands. Allowing the
GATS to absorb ICAO standards, as the FAA did in creating
FASAP, would be an efficient and probably non-controversial
means of truly integrating safety with Open Skies.
In conclusion, the United States can be the world's civil
aviation free trade advocate, but it cannot be the world's legitimate air safety policeman simultaneously. Proponents of Open
Skies and advocates of enhanced safety must get together to
improve on a current global condition which leaves one nation
state in charge of meaningful safety enforcement and a splintered trade regime which hampers multilateralism through
selective GATS treatment. Through either giving ICAO "teeth"
by undertaking a complete upheaval of its structure (and
therefore, necessarily, of the Chicago Convention) to make it

161. See Spradlin, supra note 115, at 1216-18.
162. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 137 L.N.T.S. 11.
163. Francis Lyall, Essay, The Warsaw Convention-Cutting the Gordian Knot
and the 1995 IntercarrierAgreement, 22 SYRACUSE J. INTL. L. & COM. 67, 70
(1996).
164. Id. at 67.
165. Id. at 77.
166. See GATS art. 14(c)(iii).
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reflective more of aviation than of member governments, or
preferably, by perfecting the GATS to make it speak to civil
aviation more comprehensively, the United States can be relieved of the excess baggage which it now carries in regulating
a dynamic global industry.
ShadrachA. Stanleigh

Appendix
The I.L.M. Content Summary to the Open Skies Agreement
reads as follows:'
[Preamble]
[To promote an international aviation system based upon
competition among airlines with minimal government interference and regulation; to ensure safety and security in international aviation]
Article 1 Definitions

...............................

[Aeronautical authorities; Agreement; air transportation; Convention; designated airline; full cost; international air transportation; price; stop for non-traffic purposes; territory; user
charge]
Article 2 Grant of Rights ............................
[Each party grants every other party the right of overflight,
the right to make stops for non-traffic purposes and other
rights set forth below]
Article 3 Designation and Authorization ................
[The Parties may designate airlines to conduct international
air transportation, indicating the type of transportation (see
Annexes I & II); the other Party shall grant authorization if
the airline and the Party satisfy certain prerequisites]
Article 4 Revocation of Authorization ..................
[Grounds are set forth; to be exercised after consultation with
the other Party unless immediate action is required]

1. Reproduced from 35 LL.M. 1479, 1479-81 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
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Article 5 Application of Laws ........................
[The law of the territory where the aircraft is located shall
apply]
Article 6 Safety ................................

...

[Recognition of certificates of airworthiness, certificates of
competency and licenses; the parties shall consult over safety
concerns]
Article 7 Aviation Security .........................
[Duty to provide assistance to prevent threats to the security of
civil aviation; the parties shall consult over security concerns]
Article 8 Commercial Opportunities ....................
[The right of each Party's airlines to establish sales offices in
the other Parties' territories and to bring in staff required to
provide air transportation; repatriation of profits; freedom to
pay local expenses in freely convertible currencies; cooperative
marketing arrangements are permitted]
Article 9 Customs Duties and Charges ................
[Exemptions, based on reciprocity; exceptions]
Article 10 User Charges ...........................
[Fair user charges may be imposed on a most-favored airline
basis; the competent charging authorities of the parties shall
consult and exchange information to permit review of the fairness of charges]
Article 11 Fair Competition .........................
Article 12 Pricing ..............................

...

[Prices should be determined by the market; a party may intervene in certain, limited situations; notification of prices; the
parties shall consult when issues arise]
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Article 13 Intermodal Services .......................
[Surface transportation arrangements shall be permitted]
Article 14 Consultations .........................

...

[To be conducted no later than 60 days after a Party's request]
Article 15 Settlement of Disputes ....................
[Disputes not resolved by consultations may be referred to
another person or body for decision; failing such a referral
agreement, the dispute shall be submitted to arbitration; composition of the arbitral tribunal; authority of the tribunal;
procedures; recognition of the award]
Article 16 Termination .........................

...

[By notification of a party to ICAO]
Article 17 Registration with ICAO .....................
Article 18 Entry into Force .......................

...

[Place and date done]
[Authentic texts]
[Signature block]
ANNEX I: Scheduled Transportation ...................
Section 1: Routes
Section 2: Operational Flexibility
Section 3: Change of Gauge
ANNEX II: Charter Air Transportation .................
Section 1: [Right to Carry International Charter Traffic]
Section 2: [Applicable Charter Law, Regulations and Rules]
Section 3: [Submission of a Declaration of Conformity]
ANNEX III: Principles of Non-Discrimination Within and Competition among Computer Reservations Systems ..........

